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Articles tagged: Cognitive Bias

All articles tagged with "Cognitive Bias"

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How Biases Are Formed

Pattern recognition overgeneralizes from few examples to broad rules. Cultural learning transmits biases. Emotions attach value creating preferences.

What Is the Spotlight Effect

The spotlight effect is the cognitive bias causing us to overestimate how much others notice and judge us. The Gilovich research, the illusion of transparency, and what it means for everyday life.

Hindsight Bias Explained

Hindsight bias is the tendency to believe after an event that you predicted it all along. Learn the psychology, research, and real-world consequences.

What Is the Status Quo Bias

Status quo bias is our tendency to prefer the current state of affairs over change. Learn about Samuelson and Zeckhauser's research, loss aversion, and how to overcome it.

The Halo Effect

In 1920, Edward Thorndike noticed that military officers who rated their soldiers as intelligent also rated them as physically fit, loyal, and dependable — and vice versa. The ratings correlated far more strongly than the actual traits could possibly justify. Thorndike had identified the halo effect: a single positive impression radiates outward and distorts every subsequent judgment. A century later, research shows the halo follows us into hiring, justice, medicine, and every relationship we form.

The Fundamental Attribution Error

In 1967, Edward Jones and Victor Harris asked students to rate the true attitudes of essayists who had written pro-Castro arguments. When told the writer chose the position freely, students inferred pro-Castro attitudes. When told the writer was assigned the position — forced to argue a side they might not believe — students still inferred pro-Castro attitudes. The situational constraint made no difference. The fundamental attribution error: we systematically underestimate the power of situations and overestimate the role of character when explaining other people's behavior.

The Sunk Cost Fallacy

In 1965, Britain privately knew Concorde would never turn a profit. The development costs were already sunk. The project continued for another decade. The sunk cost fallacy: why we continue failing projects, relationships, and wars because of what we have already spent — and why stopping feels like waste even when continuing creates far more of it.

Confirmation Bias: Why We Find What We're Looking For

In 1960, Peter Wason showed subjects the sequence 2-4-6 and told them it followed a rule. To discover the rule, they proposed triples. Almost universally, subjects proposed triples that fit their hypothesis — 4-6-8, 10-12-14 — and almost never proposed triples that could disprove it. The rule was simply 'any ascending sequence.' Confirmation bias: the systematic tendency to search for, favor, and remember information that confirms what we already believe.

Loss Aversion: Why Losing $100 Hurts More Than Winning $150

Kahneman and Tversky's 1979 prospect theory established that losses loom roughly 2 to 2.5 times larger than equivalent gains in subjective weight. Most people refuse a coin flip where they win $150 if heads and lose $100 if tails — despite a positive expected value. Loss aversion shapes housing markets, sports decisions, financial portfolios, and why we stay in bad situations far longer than rational calculation would predict.

The Availability Heuristic

Tversky and Kahneman asked subjects whether more English words begin with the letter K or have K as their third letter. Most said K-first — wrong by a factor of three. Words starting with K are just easier to retrieve. The availability heuristic: we judge probability and frequency by how easily examples come to mind, not by how common they actually are. The science behind risk misperception, media effects, and why we fear the wrong things.

The Dunning-Kruger Effect

In 1995, McArthur Wheeler robbed two Pittsburgh banks in broad daylight without a disguise. When police showed him surveillance footage, he was genuinely baffled. He had rubbed lemon juice on his face, believing it would make him invisible to cameras. This story prompted David Dunning and Justin Kruger's 1999 study: people with limited knowledge systematically overestimate their competence — because the skills needed to recognize incompetence are the same skills needed to perform competently.

Hanlon's Razor: Never Attribute to Malice What Stupidity

On September 26, 1983, Soviet Lt. Col. Stanislav Petrov watched five US missiles appear on his early warning screen. He chose not to retaliate — reasoning that a real attack would involve hundreds, not five. The system had a bug. Hanlon's Razor: why reaching for incompetence before malice is one of the most consequential intellectual disciplines a person can develop.