Common: In 2013, Target Corporation expanded into Canada with a $5.4 billion investment, opening 133 stores in less than two years.
When early results showed empty shelves and frustrated customers, leadership diagnosed the problem as a supply chain execution issue and doubled down on logistics optimization - hiring more distribution center staff, implementing new inventory software, and pressuring suppliers to accelerate deliveries.
Two years and billions of dollars later, Target closed every Canadian store.
Post-mortem analysis revealed that the supply chain problems were symptoms, not root causes.
The real problems were fundamental: store locations were poorly selected (many were former Zellers locations in declining malls), the product assortment did not match Canadian consumer preferences, and prices were higher than what Canadian shoppers expected relative to cross-border shopping options.
Target had applied a brilliant solution to the wrong problem - a textbook case of the most expensive mistake in professional problem-solving.
Problem-solving failures rarely stem from a lack of intelligence or effort. They follow predictable patterns rooted in cognitive biases, organizational pressures, and the absence of structured analytical processes.[7]
Research in behavioral science consistently shows that these error patterns persist across expertise levels - experienced executives make the same structural mistakes as junior analysts, they simply make them about larger problems with bigger consequences.
The consolation is that because these patterns are predictable, they are also preventable.
This article catalogues the most damaging problem-solving mistakes, explains the psychological and organizational mechanisms that produce them, and provides practical countermeasures that can be applied immediately. Understanding these traps is the first step toward avoiding them.
Jumping to Solutions
Why We Skip Problem Analysis
The single most common and most costly problem-solving mistake is generating solutions before understanding the problem. This is not carelessness; it is a deep cognitive tendency amplified by organizational culture.
1.Pattern matching triggers automatic responses. When a current situation resembles a past experience, the brain automatically retrieves the previous solution. This is efficient when the situations are genuinely similar, but catastrophic when surface similarity masks different underlying dynamics.
Example: A new CTO joins a company experiencing slow software releases. At their previous company, slow releases were caused by inadequate CI/CD pipelines, so they immediately invest $500,000 in DevOps tooling.
But at this company, the bottleneck is unclear product requirements causing rework - a problem that no amount of deployment automation can solve.
2.Action bias rewards visible activity. In most organizations, being seen "doing something" is valued more than being seen "thinking about something." The manager who launches a task force within 48 hours is praised as decisive, while the manager who spends two weeks understanding the problem is criticized as slow - even when the latter approach produces dramatically better results.
3.Discomfort with ambiguity pushes toward premature closure. Sitting with an undefined problem feels uncomfortable. A solution, even a wrong one, reduces the anxiety of not knowing what to do. Example: Customer complaints about a mobile app spike after an update.
The team immediately begins rolling back changes. A proper investigation would have revealed that the complaints were from a specific Android version with a known OS bug - the rollback removed valuable features unnecessarily.
"We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them." - Albert Einstein
How to Avoid It
1.Institute a mandatory problem definition phase. Before any solution discussion, require a written problem statement that answers: What exactly is happening? Who is affected? When did it start? What evidence do we have?
Example: Amazon's practice of writing six-page narrative memos before meetings forces analytical thinking before action.
The memo format requires defining the problem with data, exploring causes, and evaluating alternatives - all before proposing a solution.
2.Ask the "Five Whys" before proposing any fix. This simple technique from root cause analysis prevents surface-level solutions by pushing past proximate causes to systemic ones.
3.Separate the "understand" meeting from the "solve" meeting. Conduct two distinct sessions: one focused entirely on understanding the problem (no solutions allowed), and another focused on generating solutions to the now-well-defined problem.
Solving Symptoms Instead of Root Causes
The Expensive Symptom-Treatment Cycle
Treating symptoms creates a cycle of recurring problems and escalating costs. Each time the symptom reappears, resources are consumed addressing it again, while the underlying cause quietly worsens.
1.Symptoms are visible and urgent; root causes are invisible and structural. This asymmetry explains why organizations gravitate toward symptom treatment - it produces immediate relief, while root cause investigation requires patience and often reveals uncomfortable truths about systems, processes, or leadership.
Example: A customer support team is overwhelmed with tickets. The symptomatic solution is to hire more support agents - visible, immediate, and satisfying. But investigation reveals that 60% of tickets are "How do I do X?" questions caused by confusing product design and inadequate documentation.
The root cause solution - redesigning the confusing workflows and creating comprehensive help documentation - costs less than perpetual hiring and actually eliminates the problem rather than managing it.
2.The "whack-a-mole" pattern occurs when organizations treat each problem occurrence as a separate event rather than as manifestations of a common underlying cause. Example: A manufacturing company experiences equipment failures across multiple machines.
Each failure is treated individually: replace the part, restart production. Root cause analysis eventually reveals that all failures trace to a single vendor's defective components used across the factory. One vendor conversation solves dozens of seemingly separate problems.
3.Symptom treatment can mask root cause deterioration. When symptoms are suppressed without addressing causes, the underlying condition often worsens.[5]Example: A declining sales team is given larger quotas and more aggressive incentives (addressing the symptom of missed targets).
This masks the root cause: the product no longer fits the market. As the product-market gap widens, even more aggressive incentives cannot compensate, and the eventual reckoning is far more painful than it would have been with earlier diagnosis.
The Root Cause Test
Ask one simple question: "If we implement this solution, will the problem recur?" If the answer is yes, you are treating a symptom. Keep digging until you find the cause whose resolution would prevent recurrence.
| Indicator | Symptom Treatment | Root Cause Treatment |
|---|---|---|
| Duration of fix | Temporary | Permanent |
| Resource requirement | Ongoing, recurring | One-time investment |
| Problem recurrence | Keeps coming back | Resolved |
| Example | Hiring more support staff | Fixing the confusing product UX |
| System impact | Manages consequences | Eliminates the source |
Confirmation Bias in Analysis
Seeing What You Want to See
Confirmation bias is the tendency to search for, interpret, and remember information that confirms pre-existing beliefs while ignoring or discounting contradictory evidence.[3] In problem-solving, it causes analysts to build cases for their preferred explanation rather than objectively evaluating all evidence.
1.Selective evidence gathering. Once you form an initial hypothesis, you unconsciously seek evidence that supports it. Example: A product manager believes Feature A is the right priority. They notice customer requests for Feature A and cite them as evidence.
They do not seek out or weight equally the requests for Features B and C, the usage data showing Feature A's predecessor was barely used, or the survey indicating users value reliability improvements over new features.
2.Asymmetric scrutiny. Supporting evidence is accepted at face value while contradictory evidence is subjected to intense scrutiny for flaws. Example: A study showing your product outperforms competitors is accepted immediately.
A study showing the opposite is dismissed as "different methodology" or "different customer segment" - objections that might also apply to the favorable study but are never raised.
3.Narrative construction. Humans are storytelling creatures, and once a narrative forms ("our problem is pricing"), all subsequent information is integrated into that narrative. Anomalies that do not fit are ignored or explained away rather than being allowed to challenge the narrative.
Example: When Nokia was losing smartphone market share in the late 2000s, internal analysis consistently confirmed the leadership's belief that the problem was hardware quality and distribution - areas where Nokia had historically excelled.
Evidence that the real problem was software ecosystem and user experience was available but consistently downweighted because it challenged the company's identity narrative. By the time the narrative shifted, the market had moved beyond recovery.
Countermeasures
1.Actively seek disconfirming evidence. Before accepting any conclusion, explicitly ask: "What evidence would prove this wrong? Have I looked for it?" 2.Assign a devil's advocate. Give someone the explicit role of arguing against the team's emerging consensus.
3.Use structured hypothesis testing. Generate multiple competing hypotheses and test each with specific, predetermined criteria. 4.Track your prediction accuracy. Maintain a log of your analyses and whether they proved correct. This calibration exercise reveals systematic biases over time.
Accepting the First Explanation
Why "Good Enough" Explanations Are Dangerous
The first plausible explanation that comes to mind is usually the easiest to generate, not the most accurate. Cognitive science calls this "satisficing" - accepting the first option that meets a minimum threshold rather than seeking the best option.
1.Cognitive ease favors the first explanation. Generating the first explanation reduces the discomfort of not understanding. Once that relief arrives, the motivation to generate alternatives drops sharply. The first explanation feels right because it ended the uncertainty, not because it is correct.
Example: A website's conversion rate drops after a redesign. First explanation: "The new design is worse." But alternative explanations exist: seasonal traffic changes, a Google algorithm update reducing traffic quality, a competitor's promotional campaign, or a technical issue (page load time increased during the redesign deployment).
The first explanation might be right, but it should be tested against alternatives, not accepted by default.
2.Organizational hierarchy amplifies the problem. When a senior leader offers the first explanation, the team rarely generates alternatives. The combination of authority and the relief of having an explanation creates a powerful inhibition against further investigation.
3.The narrative fallacy (described by Nassim Taleb) drives people to construct causal stories from coincidences.[9] Two events occurring in sequence feel causally connected even when the relationship is purely temporal.
The Minimum Alternative Rule
Before accepting any explanation, generate at least three plausible alternatives. This simple discipline dramatically improves diagnostic accuracy. You do not need to prove the alternatives correct - merely generating them forces you to consider what other factors might be at play and what evidence would distinguish between explanations.
Analysis Paralysis
When Thinking Becomes a Substitute for Acting
Analysis paralysis occurs when the pursuit of perfect information prevents timely decision-making. While jumping to solutions is a more common error, its opposite - endless analysis without action - is equally destructive.
1.Diminishing returns of additional analysis. The first 70% of relevant information can usually be gathered quickly. The next 20% requires significantly more effort. The final 10% may be impossible to obtain before acting. Waiting for 100% certainty means deciding too late - or never.
Example: A team spent four months evaluating technology stacks, conducting proof-of-concept implementations of six alternatives, and writing comparison documents. During that period, a competitor launched a product using any one of the viable stacks. The analysis was thorough but the delay was catastrophic.
2.Perfectionism masquerading as thoroughness. Analysis paralysis is often driven by fear of being wrong rather than genuine need for more information. The analyst who cannot stop researching is frequently avoiding the accountability that comes with making a recommendation.
3.The cost of delay is invisible but real. Unlike the cost of a wrong decision (which is visible and attributable), the cost of delayed decision (market opportunity missed, team demoralized, resources idle) is diffuse and harder to assign to any individual's failure to act.
Breaking the Paralysis
1.Set decision deadlines before starting analysis. "We will decide by Friday with whatever information we have." 2.Match analysis depth to decision stakes and reversibility. High-stakes, irreversible decisions warrant thorough analysis.
Low-stakes, reversible decisions should be made quickly. 3.Ask: "What additional information would actually change my decision?" If no realistic answer exists, you have enough information to decide.
4.Use the 70% rule. Jeff Bezos advocates deciding when you have roughly 70% of the information you wish you had, because waiting for 90% means deciding too late in most fast-moving environments.
"A good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan executed next week." - George S. Patton
Optimizing the Wrong Metrics
Goodhart's Law in Action
When a metric becomes a target, it ceases to be a good metric. This principle, known as Goodhart's Law, produces some of the most insidious problem-solving failures because the metrics look like they are improving while the actual goal is not.
1.Proxy metrics diverge from real goals. Organizations often measure what is easy to measure rather than what matters. Example: A customer success team is measured on "customer health score" based on product usage frequency.
They optimize for login counts - sending engagement emails, creating unnecessary notifications, gamifying usage.
Health scores improve. But customer satisfaction and renewal rates do not, because customers logging in more frequently does not mean they are getting more value. The metric was a proxy, and optimizing the proxy diverged from the goal.
2.Local optimization at the expense of global performance. When each department optimizes its own metrics, the organization as a whole can suffer. Example: Sales optimizes for deals closed (their metric) by making aggressive promises about product capabilities.
Engineering optimizes for features shipped (their metric) by rushing development. Customer support handles the resulting complaints (their metric: tickets resolved). Each department hits its numbers while the customer experience deteriorates and churn rises - a global metric that no single department owns.
3.The cobra effect. Named after a colonial-era policy in India where a bounty on cobra skins led people to breed cobras for the bounty, this phenomenon occurs when incentivizing a metric produces behavior that worsens the underlying problem.
Example: A software company measured developer productivity by lines of code written. Developers began writing verbose, unnecessarily complex code to hit their numbers. Code quality, the actual goal, declined as the metric improved.
Wells Fargo's fake accounts scandal is perhaps the most notorious modern example: branch employees created millions of unauthorized accounts to meet aggressive cross-selling targets, optimizing the metric while destroying the customer relationships the metric was meant to proxy for.
Binary Thinking and Limited Options
The False Dichotomy Trap
Framing decisions as "either X or Y" when more options exist artificially constrains the solution space and often forces a choice between two suboptimal alternatives when better hybrid or third options exist.[11]
1.Either/or framing is cognitively easy. It simplifies complex situations into two camps, making discussion and debate straightforward. But this simplicity comes at the cost of missing creative solutions that combine elements of multiple approaches.
Example: "Either we build this feature in-house or we buy a vendor solution." This binary frame misses: building a minimal version in-house and supplementing with a vendor, open-sourcing the problem and contributing to an existing solution, partnering with another company to share development costs, or deferring the feature entirely and solving the underlying problem differently.
2.Organizational debates often calcify into binary positions. Once two camps form around opposing proposals, the discussion becomes about winning rather than finding the best answer. The political dynamic of choosing sides prevents exploration of alternatives that neither camp has proposed.
3.The antidote: When you notice "either/or" framing, always ask: "What other options exist?" Force yourself to generate at least three to five alternatives before committing to a decision.
Not Involving the Right Perspectives
The Blind Spot Problem
Solving problems in isolation or with a homogeneous group virtually guarantees blind spots. The perspectives you lack are precisely the ones that would reveal flaws in your reasoning or constraints you have not considered.
1.Frontline knowledge is systematically underutilized. The people closest to the problem - customer support agents, sales representatives, operations staff - often have the most accurate understanding of what is actually happening, but are rarely consulted during problem-solving.
Example: When a retail chain redesigned its checkout process, the design team consulted UX researchers and store managers but not checkout clerks.
The clerks could have identified that the new process required customers to interact with a screen placed at an angle that was unreadable in the afternoon glare - a problem that added 30 seconds per transaction and frustrated thousands of customers daily.
2.Cross-functional blind spots occur when a team from one function solves a problem that spans multiple functions without input from the others.
Example: An engineering team redesigns a feature without consulting the support team (who knows the common user struggles), the sales team (who knows the customer objections), or actual users (who know the real workflows).
The redesign solves the engineering team's perceived problem while creating new problems for every other stakeholder.
3.The fix: Before solving, ask: "Who has a different perspective on this? Who will be affected by our solution? Who has relevant experience we lack?" Then actually include those people - not as an afterthought, but as contributors to the problem definition itself.
Anchoring on Sunk Costs
Throwing Good Resources After Bad
The sunk cost fallacy - continuing an effort because of past investment rather than future value - is one of the most well-documented and most persistent cognitive biases.
1.Loss aversion makes abandonment painful. Stopping a project crystallizes the loss of all past investment. Continuing preserves the hope (however slim) that the investment might yet pay off. The psychological pain of "wasting" past effort overwhelms the rational analysis of future returns.[2]
Example: The Concorde supersonic jet continued receiving government funding for years after it became clear that the program would never be commercially viable.
The massive sunk costs created political and psychological pressure to continue rather than acknowledge the loss - a phenomenon so common in this context that economists coined the term "Concorde fallacy."
2.Commitment escalation compounds the problem. Having publicly committed to a project, leaders face reputational costs from abandoning it. Each additional investment increases the psychological commitment.
Example: A company that has publicly announced a product launch date and invested 10 months of development keeps building despite mounting evidence that the market has shifted, because cancellation would require explaining the "wasted" investment to the board, employees, and customers.
3.The antidote question: "If we were starting fresh today with everything we now know, would we invest in this?" If the answer is no, the fact that you have already invested should not change the decision. Past investment is gone regardless of what you do next.
The Meta-Mistake: No Structured Process
Why All These Errors Share a Common Root
Every mistake catalogued above becomes more likely in the absence of a structured problem-solving process. Ad-hoc, intuitive approaches to problem-solving leave you vulnerable to whichever cognitive bias happens to be most active in the moment.
1. Define the problem clearly (prevents jumping to solutions). 2. Investigate root causes (prevents solving symptoms). 3. Generate multiple hypotheses (prevents accepting the first explanation). 4. Actively seek disconfirming evidence (prevents confirmation bias).
5. Consider multiple alternatives (prevents binary thinking). 6. Involve diverse perspectives (prevents blind spots). 7. Set decision deadlines and act (prevents analysis paralysis). 8. Measure actual goals, not proxies (prevents wrong metric optimization).
9. Consider system-wide effects (prevents local optimization). 10. Evaluate future value, ignore sunk costs (prevents escalation of commitment).
Example: When Toyota encounters a quality problem, their structured process (the Toyota Production System) requires following each of these steps explicitly.[6]
Problems are defined with precision, root causes are investigated through the Five Whys, multiple contributing factors are considered, and solutions are tested before full implementation.
This is not because Toyota employees are inherently smarter - it is because the process prevents the cognitive errors that unstructured approaches allow.
Concise Synthesis
Problem-solving mistakes follow predictable patterns that persist across intelligence levels and expertise domains: jumping to solutions without understanding the problem, treating symptoms rather than root causes, confirmation bias in analysis, accepting the first plausible explanation, analysis paralysis, optimizing wrong metrics, binary thinking that constrains options, excluding critical perspectives, and anchoring on sunk costs.
These errors share a common root: the absence of structured process that forces discipline at each stage of problem-solving. Intelligence does not prevent these mistakes - structured thinking and explicit countermeasures do.
The most expensive failures in business history were not caused by stupid people making obvious errors. They were caused by smart, experienced professionals who skipped problem definition, confirmed their existing beliefs, treated symptoms as root causes, and continued investing in failing approaches because of past commitments.
The antidote is not more intelligence but more discipline: define before solving, investigate before concluding, consider alternatives before choosing, and evaluate future value before citing past investment.
What Research Shows About Problem-Solving Mistakes
The academic literature on problem-solving failures has identified specific, consistent patterns that transcend domain and expertise level - findings that are both humbling and actionable.
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky's foundational heuristics-and-biases research program (1974-2002) established the cognitive mechanisms underlying the most common problem-solving mistakes.[1]
Their experiments, conducted at Hebrew University and Stanford, demonstrated that confirmation bias, anchoring, and availability bias are not aberrations of flawed thinking but standard features of System 1 cognition that affect everyone, including experts.
Particularly relevant to problem-solving is their research on the "focusing illusion" - the tendency to treat the first salient feature of a problem as its defining characteristic, leading to solutions optimized for a feature that may not be the central driver.
Their experimental work showed that when subjects were given a problem description that highlighted one element, their proposed solutions tended to focus on that element regardless of whether it was actually the most important factor.
Barry Staw at UC Berkeley published a landmark 1981 study in the Academy of Management Review on "escalation of commitment" - the organizational manifestation of sunk cost reasoning.[4]
Staw's research, which has been replicated over 40 times across different cultures and domains, showed that decision-makers who were personally responsible for an initial failing decision invested significantly more additional resources in that failing course than decision-makers who had no personal responsibility for the original choice.
The key mechanism was not irrationality but motivated reasoning: people who had publicly committed to a direction unconsciously sought evidence supporting continuation.
Staw's research also identified organizational factors that intensify escalation - public commitment (announcing the decision), sunk cost prominence (frequent reminders of what has been invested), and unclear performance criteria (ambiguity about whether the initiative is actually failing).
Dietrich Dorner at the University of Bamberg conducted a remarkable series of studies published in The Logic of Failure (1996) using computer simulations of complex social and ecological systems.[8]
Participants were asked to manage simulated cities, agricultural systems, and factories - environments with realistic feedback delays and interconnected variables.
The results were stark: the vast majority of participants made the same characteristic mistakes regardless of their education or problem-solving experience.
They acted too quickly without understanding the system, treated obvious symptoms as root causes, ignored side effects and feedback loops, and became overconfident after initial successes.
Only a small minority of participants - those who systematically analyzed the system before acting, tested interventions carefully, and updated their mental models based on outcomes - achieved stable improvements.
Dorner's finding that intelligent people consistently failed in complex environments unless they used disciplined processes provides strong experimental support for the claim that structured problem solving compensates for inherent cognitive limitations.
Roger Martin at the Rotman School of Management documented a specific organizational problem-solving mistake in The Opposable Mind (2007): organizations that frame problems as trade-offs ("we can have quality or speed, not both") consistently underperform organizations that reframe trade-offs as design challenges requiring creative synthesis.
His analysis of 50 leaders who consistently outperformed their peers found that the single most distinguishing cognitive habit was refusing to accept binary problem framings and instead investing in understanding the underlying models that produced the apparent trade-off.
Real-World Case Studies in Problem-Solving Mistakes
Target Canada's Failure (2013-2015): Target's Canadian expansion, described in this article's opening, has been extensively documented by business journalists including Joe Castaldo in a 2016 Canadian Business post-mortem. The case illustrates multiple compounding problem-solving mistakes.
The initial framing mistake (defining supply chain execution as the problem when the real problems were location selection and product-market fit) was compounded by confirmation bias: Target's leadership team had strong conviction in the brand's cross-border appeal and unconsciously discounted evidence to the contrary.
Early warning signals - inventory shortfalls, pricing complaints, underwhelming sales at flagship locations - were interpreted as implementation problems rather than strategic signals that the original thesis was flawed.
Sunk cost reasoning then locked in continued investment: having committed $5.4 billion and opened 133 stores, abandoning the Canada strategy became psychologically and financially unacceptable despite mounting evidence that the core problem was not solvable through operational improvements.
The estimated loss was approximately $7 billion including closure costs. Post-mortem analysis by Antony Karabus at HRC Advisory identified that a proper market analysis conducted before launch would have revealed the fundamental location and pricing problems at a cost of roughly $10 million.
Nokia's Smartphone Platform Decision (2007-2013): Nokia's failure to respond effectively to the iPhone is a documented case of multiple simultaneous problem-solving mistakes studied by researchers Timo Vuori and Quy Huy at INSEAD (Administrative Science Quarterly, 2016).
Their research, based on interviews with 76 Nokia managers and engineers, revealed that Nokia's engineers correctly identified the threat and the required solution as early as 2007, but organizational problem-solving processes produced a cascading set of failures.
Middle managers, fearing career consequences for delivering bad news, systematically filtered information before presenting it to senior leadership - a structural problem-solving mistake where the wrong perspectives were included.
Senior leadership, anchored on Nokia's existing strengths (hardware manufacturing, carrier relationships, cost efficiency), framed the smartphone challenge as a hardware and distribution problem rather than a software ecosystem problem - the anchoring mistake.
And when early touchscreen and ecosystem initiatives failed, sunk costs in the Symbian platform made it psychologically difficult to fully commit to an alternative.[10] Nokia's smartphone market share fell from 49% in 2007 to under 5% by 2012.
The Concorde Programme (1962-2003): The Concorde supersonic airliner is the origin case for the "Concorde fallacy" - the economic term for sunk cost reasoning.
As documented by economists Hal Arkes and Catherine Blumer (1985, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes), the British and French governments continued funding Concorde development through the late 1960s and 1970s despite progressively mounting evidence that the aircraft would never be commercially viable.
Sonic boom restrictions eliminated transcontinental routes, oil price increases made operating costs prohibitive, and the economics of a 100-passenger supersonic aircraft in a market dominated by 400-passenger subsonic jets were fundamentally unworkable.
Internal government documents, later made public, showed that analysts within both governments produced accurate assessments of commercial unviability as early as 1969 - but the framing of the problem as "we have invested too much to stop" made the correct decision (termination) politically impossible.
The program continued for an additional 34 years, with Concorde finally retired in 2003 having never achieved commercial profitability.
Wells Fargo's Fake Accounts Scandal (2013-2016): The Wells Fargo case illustrates how optimizing the wrong metrics compounds into an organizational crisis. As documented in the U.S. Senate Banking Committee hearings (2016) and subsequent academic research by C.H.
Liu and N. Ryan (Journal of Financial Regulation, 2018), Wells Fargo's leadership identified declining cross-sell ratios in the early 2010s and diagnosed the problem as "insufficient product penetration" - a metric-level framing that missed the root cause (customers did not want additional products).
The solution - aggressive cross-selling quotas enforced through branch performance management - optimized the metric (cross-sell ratio) while destroying the underlying goal (customer trust and genuine product adoption). Branch employees, unable to organically meet quotas, created approximately 3.5 million unauthorized accounts.
The metric improved; the actual customer relationship deteriorated. A proper root cause analysis of why customers were not adopting additional products - which would have revealed pricing, product relevance, and relationship quality issues - was never conducted because the metric framing made the solution (more aggressive selling) appear obvious.
Sources & Further Reading
- Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Arkes, H. R., & Blumer, C. (1985). "The Psychology of Sunk Cost." Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 35(1), 124-140.
- Nickerson, R. S. (1998). "Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises." Review of General Psychology, 2(2), 175-220.
- Staw, B. M. (1981). "The Escalation of Commitment to a Course of Action." Academy of Management Review, 6(4), 577-587.
- Meadows, D. H. (2008). Thinking in Systems: A Primer. Chelsea Green Publishing.
- Liker, J. K. (2004). The Toyota Way. McGraw-Hill.
- Bazerman, M. H., & Moore, D. A. (2012). Judgment in Managerial Decision Making. John Wiley & Sons.
- Dorner, D. (1996). The Logic of Failure. Basic Books.
- Taleb, N. N. (2007). The Black Swan. Random House.
- Sull, D. N. (2003). "Why Good Companies Go Bad." Harvard Business Review.
- Heath, C., & Heath, D. (2013). Decisive: How to Make Better Choices in Life and Work. Crown Business.
Further Reading
- Klein, G. (2013). Seeing What Others Don't. PublicAffairs.
Part of This Series
Structured Critical Thinking for Better Decision-Making
Critical Thinking: Enhancing Decision-Making Skills
Critical Thinking: Skills and Barriers to Improvement
Structured Problem Solving: Systematic Steps to Success
Problem Framing: Defining Issues Before Seeking Solutions
Analytical Thinking Skills: Simplifying Complex Problems
Thinking in Tradeoffs: Weighing Costs and Benefits
