In 1792, Mary Wollstonecraft published A Vindication of the Rights of Woman — the argument, startling to her contemporaries, that women's apparent intellectual inferiority was not natural but a product of their inferior education. Women were being raised to please men rather than to think. Give women the same education as men, she argued, and you would find that the supposed mental weakness was an artifact of circumstance, not evidence of inherent incapacity. The book scandalized polite society and was largely dismissed. Wollstonecraft died nine days after giving birth to her daughter, who would grow up to write Frankenstein, and whose own life became a favorite target of those who wished to discredit her mother's ideas by associating them with personal scandal.
In 1848, the Seneca Falls Convention issued a Declaration of Sentiments modeled word for word on the Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men and women are created equal." The organizers, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott, had been barred from speaking at the World Anti-Slavery Convention in London in 1840 on the grounds of their sex — an experience of exclusion that had sharpened their understanding of what they were fighting. The convention's demand for women's suffrage was considered so radical that even some supporters urged its removal lest the entire declaration be discredited. It took 72 more years and a constitutional amendment.
In 1963, Betty Friedan published The Feminine Mystique, naming "the problem that has no name" — the dissatisfaction, the sense of incompleteness, the quietly desperate boredom of educated women confined to suburban domesticity, expected to find fulfillment entirely in homemaking and child-rearing in a culture that told them this was all they could want. The book sold 3 million copies in three years. Feminism is not one idea. It is a long argument, still unfinished, about the nature of equality, the sources of inequality, and what justice between men and women actually requires.
"One is not born, but rather becomes, woman. No biological, psychological, or economic destiny defines the figure that the human female takes on in society; it is civilization as a whole that determines this creature." — Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (1949)
| Wave | Period | Core Focus |
|---|---|---|
| First wave | Late 1800s-1920s | Suffrage, legal equality, property rights |
| Second wave | 1960s-1980s | Workplace equality, reproductive rights, social roles |
| Third wave | 1990s-2000s | Intersectionality, sexuality, individual expression |
| Fourth wave | 2010s-present | Online activism, sexual harassment, #MeToo |
| Intersectional feminism | Ongoing | Race, class, gender, sexuality as interlocking systems |
Key Definitions
First wave feminism: The feminist movement of the 19th and early 20th centuries, focused primarily on legal equality and especially women's suffrage.
Second wave feminism: The feminist movement of the 1960s through 1980s, expanding from legal rights to personal liberation, workplace equality, reproductive rights, and the critique of patriarchy as a systemic structure.
Third wave feminism: The feminist politics of the 1990s and 2000s, emphasizing diversity, individual expression, and intersectionality as correctives to second wave's tendency to speak from a white, middle-class position.
Fourth wave feminism: Contemporary feminism, from approximately 2012 onward, characterized by social media organizing, intersectionality, and particular focus on sexual harassment and assault.
Liberal feminism: The position that gender inequality results from unequal laws and institutions, and that reform — equal rights, equal access, equal treatment — is the appropriate remedy.
Radical feminism: The position that gender inequality results from patriarchy as a systemic structure embedded in sexuality, family, and culture, requiring deeper transformation than legal reform.
Socialist feminism: The position that gender and class oppression are inseparable systems that must be analyzed and dismantled together.
Intersectionality: Kimberlé Crenshaw's framework for analyzing how multiple social identities — race, gender, class, sexuality — interact to create distinct forms of disadvantage and privilege.
Gender vs sex distinction: The conceptual separation between biological sex (physical characteristics) and gender (socially constructed roles, identities, and expressions). De Beauvoir introduced it philosophically; subsequent feminism developed it extensively.
Patriarchy: The system of social structures and practices through which men dominate, oppress, and exploit women, embedded in institutions, culture, and intimate relationships.
Gender pay gap: The difference in average earnings between men and women, which varies depending on whether and how it is adjusted for occupation, experience, and hours worked.
Reproductive rights: The right of women to make autonomous decisions about pregnancy, contraception, and abortion.
Ecofeminism: The feminist analysis connecting the domination of nature with the domination of women, arguing both stem from the same patriarchal logic.
Postfeminist debate: The argument that feminism's goals have been substantially achieved and a distinctly feminist politics is no longer necessary — a claim most feminist scholars reject.
First Wave: The Long Fight for Legal Standing
The first wave of feminism had deep roots in Enlightenment principles of natural rights, but those principles had been consistently applied to men only. The philosophical groundwork was laid by Wollstonecraft's Vindication (1792), which argued in the language of reason and education that there was no natural basis for women's subordination. But the organized movement coalesced around the suffrage question in the 19th century.
The Seneca Falls Convention of 1848 was the first formal women's rights convention in the United States. Its Declaration of Sentiments, drafted primarily by Elizabeth Cady Stanton, listed eighteen grievances — from denial of the vote to exclusion from education and the professions to the legal fiction that a married woman had no existence independent of her husband. Stanton's insistence on including women's suffrage in the declaration almost prevented its passage; Frederick Douglass's speech in support proved decisive.
In Britain, the suffrage movement split between the constitutional suffragists, organized under Millicent Fawcett, who pursued legal and parliamentary change, and the militant suffragettes of the Women's Social and Political Union, founded by Emmeline Pankhurst in 1903. The suffragettes disrupted political meetings, broke windows, committed arson, and, when imprisoned, went on hunger strikes that were met with force-feeding. Emily Wilding Davison died under the King's horse at the Epsom Derby in 1913 in the most famous act of suffragette militancy. British women over 30 received partial suffrage in 1918; full equal suffrage came in 1928.
The 19th Amendment to the US Constitution, ratified in 1920, granted women the right to vote — 72 years after Seneca Falls. But first-wave feminism's achievements were substantially limited to white, middle-class women. The voting rights of Black women in the American South remained effectively suppressed until the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The first wave won important battles within an unjust system without fully confronting the system's deeper structures.
Second Wave: The Personal Is Political
If the first wave was about women's legal status as citizens, the second wave was about everything else. It was animated by the perception that legal equality, even where achieved, had not produced actual equality — that the subordination of women was embedded in the economy, in the family, in sexuality, and in culture in ways that formal rights could not touch.
Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex, published in 1949, provided the philosophical architecture. Its central claim — that "woman" is not a natural category but a social construction, that women are defined as "the Other" against the male norm — gave second-wave feminism a theoretical framework that went beyond the language of rights to a critique of the entire structure of gender difference. De Beauvoir's existentialist argument that women had been denied the condition for authentic human self-determination — freedom, transcendence, the capacity to define themselves — framed the second wave's ambitions as nothing less than full human liberation.
Betty Friedan's The Feminine Mystique (1963) translated philosophical analysis into lived experience. Friedan had surveyed her Smith College classmates fifteen years after graduation and found widespread dissatisfaction among women who had done everything they were supposed to do — married, raised children, maintained homes — and found it insufficient. The book named the problem and suggested its cause: a culture that had narrowed women's possibilities to domestic roles while pretending this was natural fulfillment. Friedan co-founded the National Organization for Women (NOW) in 1966.
The second wave's theoretical radicalism came from Kate Millett's Sexual Politics (1970) and Shulamith Firestone's The Dialectic of Sex (1970). Millett argued that "politics" needed to be understood not just as formal government but as any power-structured relationship, including sexual ones; she analyzed literary texts by Norman Mailer, Henry Miller, and D.H. Lawrence to show how they expressed and reinforced male dominance. Firestone drew on Marx and Engels to argue that the biological family was the original site of women's oppression, and that genuine liberation would require not just equal rights but the transformation of reproduction itself — a conclusion that struck many readers as utopian but that sharpened the analysis of how deeply oppression was rooted.
Consciousness-raising groups became the distinctive organizing form of the second wave: small groups of women meeting to share personal experiences and develop a shared analysis of their social situation. The practice embodied the slogan "the personal is political" — the argument that experiences previously understood as private or individual (sexual harassment, domestic violence, the unequal division of household labor) were in fact political, structured by power relations that systematic analysis could reveal and change.
Major second-wave achievements included Roe v. Wade (1973), which established a constitutional right to abortion; Title IX (1972), prohibiting sex discrimination in education; legal recognition of marital rape as a crime; and Catharine MacKinnon's development of sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. MacKinnon's Sexual Harassment of Working Women (1979) provided the legal theory that allowed sexual harassment claims, fundamentally changing workplace law.
Intersectionality: Who Gets to Be "Woman"?
The second wave's greatest limitation was its tendency to generalize from the experience of white, middle-class, heterosexual, Western women to "women's experience" as a whole. Black feminists, working-class feminists, and feminist scholars from the developing world had been pointing this out since at least the 1970s. The Combahee River Collective's statement (1977) articulated a Black feminist politics that was simultaneously anti-racist, anti-sexist, and anti-capitalist, insisting that these oppressions were not separable.
Kimberlé Crenshaw's 1989 paper "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics" gave this analysis a name and a legal framework. Crenshaw examined actual court cases — including DeGraffenreid v. General Motors — to show how Black women's specific disadvantages fell through the cracks of laws designed to address race discrimination or sex discrimination separately but not both simultaneously. General Motors had not discriminated against Black people (it hired Black men) and had not discriminated against women (it hired white women). It had discriminated specifically against Black women, and existing legal frameworks had no category for that.
Intersectionality became, in the 1990s and 2000s, one of the most widely used frameworks in feminist theory, sociology, and critical race studies. Patricia Hill Collins extended it in Black Feminist Thought (1990), describing a "matrix of domination" in which systems of race, class, gender, and sexuality are not parallel oppressions but interlocking, mutually constituting structures. Chandra Mohanty's "Under Western Eyes" (1984) applied a parallel analysis internationally, critiquing Western feminist representations of "third world women" as a homogeneous, victimized mass that erased the agency and diversity of women in non-Western societies.
The implications for feminist politics were significant. If women's experiences are not homogeneous but shaped by race, class, sexuality, and nationality, then feminist movements that speak for "all women" from a position of racial and class privilege are reproducing the same logic of universalization from a partial standpoint that patriarchy uses. Effective feminist politics requires attending to differences among women, not just commonalities.
Third Wave: Diversity and Individual Voice
The third wave emerged in the early 1990s partly from the limitations of the second wave and partly from a specific galvanizing event: the Senate confirmation hearings for Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas in 1991, during which law professor Anita Hill testified that Thomas had sexually harassed her when she worked for him at the Department of Education and the EEOC. The Senate's handling of Hill's testimony — she faced intense, often hostile questioning from an all-male Judiciary Committee — outraged many women and catalyzed a new generation of feminist activism. Rebecca Walker, daughter of Alice Walker and Gloria Steinem, published a response in Ms. Magazine titled "Becoming the Third Wave."
Third-wave feminism was characterized by its embrace of diversity and individual expression. Where the second wave had been suspicious of femininity — high heels, makeup, and other forms of "performing" for male approval — the third wave argued that women could engage with traditionally feminine aesthetics on their own terms and that the second wave's critique of femininity was itself prescriptive and paternalistic. The riot grrrl movement in punk music — bands like Bikini Kill and Sleater-Kinney — embodied a feminism that was angry, confrontational, and comfortable with contradiction.
Third-wave feminism also produced significant tensions around sexuality. The second wave had been divided over pornography — some radical feminists, including Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon, argued that pornography was a form of sexual violence against women and should be regulated; others argued that this conflated representation with harm and risked allying feminism with censorship and social conservatism. The third wave generally embraced sex-positivity: the argument that consensual sexual expression, including pornography and sex work under conditions of genuine choice, could be compatible with feminist values, and that the policing of female sexuality was itself a patriarchal practice.
Fourth Wave and #MeToo
The fourth wave is distinguished above all by its medium: social media has transformed feminist organizing from a model requiring formal organizations and institutional resources to one in which millions of people can coordinate action across geographic and social boundaries. Online campaigns like #EverydaySexism, #YesAllWomen, and most powerfully #MeToo have created new forms of feminist visibility and accountability.
Tarana Burke began using the phrase "Me Too" in 2006 while working with survivors of sexual violence in low-income communities. The phrase was intended to create solidarity — to let survivors know they were not alone. When Alyssa Milano tweeted the phrase in October 2017 in response to reporting about Harvey Weinstein, it went viral in hours, and millions of women shared their own experiences of harassment and assault. Within weeks, a wave of powerful men in entertainment, media, journalism, and politics had been forced to resign or step back as long-buried allegations became publicly visible.
The movement raised serious questions about accountability, due process, and proportionality that the fourth wave has not fully resolved. The spectrum of allegations ranged from rape and serial assault to unwanted touching to clumsy and offensive behavior, and the consequences — public humiliation, loss of career — were not always proportionate to the offense. The question of whether accusation should be treated as proof, or whether the legal presumption of innocence should govern public judgment, became a source of significant conflict within feminism itself.
What the fourth wave demonstrated unambiguously was that the structural features enabling sexual harassment — power imbalances, career dependency, institutional cultures of silence — were pervasive across industries, geographies, and income levels, and that the legal and institutional mechanisms for addressing them were systematically inadequate.
The Gender Pay Gap
The gender pay gap is one of the most cited and most misunderstood statistics in feminist discourse. The raw gap in median full-time earnings between men and women in the United States is approximately 16 to 18 percent, meaning women earn roughly 82 to 84 cents for every dollar men earn. This figure has narrowed substantially since the 1970s (when it was closer to 40 percent) but has plateaued in recent decades.
The raw gap reflects several overlapping factors, and disentangling them is the work of labor economics. Occupational segregation — the concentration of women in lower-paying fields and men in higher-paying ones — is a major component. Female-dominated occupations (childcare, social work, nursing, elementary school teaching) systematically pay less than male-dominated occupations requiring comparable skill and education, a pattern that appears to reflect the social devaluation of "women's work" rather than differences in productivity or required expertise. Studies tracking what happens when a formerly male-dominated occupation becomes female-dominated — as happened with secretarial work and with veterinary medicine — find that wages tend to decline as women enter and increase if men return.
Claudia Goldin, whose research on women's labor market participation over the 20th century won the 2023 Nobel Prize in Economics, has identified what she calls the "last chapter" of the gender pay gap. Even among workers with identical education, occupation, and experience, a gap persists, and Goldin's research attributes it primarily to the earnings premium for temporal flexibility: jobs that pay disproportionately high returns to workers who can work long, unpredictable hours and be available on employer demand without schedule interruption tend to be disproportionately held by men, in part because caregiving responsibilities — still distributed very unequally between mothers and fathers — make such schedules incompatible with family life for most women. The motherhood penalty (the earnings decline after having children, averaging 4 percent per child in a Cedric de Chaisemartin and colleagues' analysis) compounds over time; there is no equivalent fatherhood penalty.
The adjusted gap, controlling for occupation, industry, hours, and experience, is typically estimated at 5 to 8 percent. This figure likely reflects a combination of remaining discrimination, negotiation differences (women are penalized more for salary negotiation than men), and unmeasured factors. The adjusted gap is smaller than the raw gap but is not zero, and the factors that create the raw gap — occupational segregation, the motherhood penalty, the devaluation of female-dominated work — are themselves outcomes of gender inequality, not natural differences.
Theoretical Debates: Gender, Performance, and Essentialism
The most consequential theoretical development in late-20th-century feminism was Judith Butler's Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (1990), which argued that gender itself — not just sex roles, but the binary categories of "man" and "woman" — was socially constructed through performative repetition. Drawing on Foucault's analysis of how power produces the subjects it appears to regulate, and on Derrida's deconstruction of binary oppositions, Butler argued that gender is not an expression of a pre-existing biological or psychological identity but is constituted in performance: through repeated acts, discourses, and stylizations of the body that create the appearance of a natural, interior gender identity. What we take to be the expression of gender is actually its construction.
This argument had radical implications. If gender is a performance rather than a natural fact, then the category "woman" that feminism takes as its political subject is not a given but a construction that needs to be interrogated. The feminist appeal to "women's interests" or "women's experience" risks reinstating the very gender binary that feminism should be challenging. Butler's work became enormously influential in queer theory and in the theoretical debates around transgender identity: if gender is performatively constituted rather than biologically determined, the claim that trans women are women because they identify as and enact femininity has philosophical resources that biological definitions of sex cannot provide.
The debate between essentialist and constructivist positions in feminist theory has been one of the most productive and most contentious in modern philosophy. Essentialists — including many radical feminists — argue that biological sex is real and that the specific forms of oppression women face (sexual violence, reproductive coercion, pregnancy discrimination) are grounded in female biology. If you dissolve the category of biological sex, you lose the analytical tools to describe and address those specific harms. Constructivists respond that "natural" biological categories have always been used to justify oppression, and that a truly liberatory politics cannot ground itself in the very distinctions that have historically been used to subordinate women.
Cross-References
Related articles: what is gender, what is race, what is justice
References
- Wollstonecraft, M. (1792). A Vindication of the Rights of Woman. J. Johnson.
- de Beauvoir, S. (1949). The Second Sex. Gallimard. (English translation: H.M. Parshley, 1953)
- Friedan, B. (1963). The Feminine Mystique. W.W. Norton.
- Millett, K. (1970). Sexual Politics. Doubleday.
- Firestone, S. (1970). The Dialectic of Sex. William Morrow.
- Crenshaw, K. (1989). Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex. University of Chicago Legal Forum, 1989(1), 139-167.
- Collins, P.H. (1990). Black Feminist Thought. Unwin Hyman.
- Butler, J. (1990). Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. Routledge.
- MacKinnon, C. (1979). Sexual Harassment of Working Women. Yale University Press.
- Goldin, C. (2014). A grand gender convergence: Its last chapter. American Economic Review, 104(4), 1091-1119. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.4.1091
- Mohanty, C.T. (1984). Under Western Eyes: Feminist scholarship and colonial discourses. Boundary 2, 12(3), 333-358.
Frequently Asked Questions
What are the four waves of feminism?
Feminism is conventionally described in four waves, each responding to the limitations of its predecessor and the social conditions of its time. The first wave (roughly 1840s to 1920s) focused primarily on legal rights, especially the right to vote. The Seneca Falls Convention of 1848, organized by Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott, issued a Declaration of Sentiments modeled on the Declaration of Independence, demanding voting rights and broader civic equality. The 19th Amendment granting women's suffrage was ratified in the United States in 1920. The second wave (1960s to 1980s) expanded from legal rights to personal and social liberation. Betty Friedan's The Feminine Mystique (1963) named the dissatisfaction of educated women confined to domestic roles; Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex (1949) had already provided its philosophical foundation. Second-wave feminism addressed workplace discrimination, reproductive rights (culminating in Roe v. Wade in 1973), and violence against women. The third wave (1990s to 2000s) arose partly as a critique of second-wave feminism's tendency to speak for 'all women' while actually reflecting the concerns of white, middle-class women. It embraced diversity, individual expression, and intersectionality. The fourth wave (approximately 2012 onward) is characterized by its use of social media as an organizing tool and its focus on sexual harassment and assault. The #MeToo movement, founded by Tarana Burke in 2006 and going viral in 2017 with the Harvey Weinstein exposure, is its defining moment.
What is the gender pay gap and how large is it?
The gender pay gap is the difference in average earnings between men and women, and its size depends entirely on what you measure and how. The raw or unadjusted gap — comparing median full-time earnings of all men and all women — is approximately 16 to 18 percent in the United States and similar in many Western countries, meaning women earn roughly 82 to 84 cents for every dollar men earn. When researchers control for occupation, industry, hours worked, and years of experience, the adjusted gap narrows considerably, to approximately 5 to 8 percent. This adjusted gap represents unexplained earnings differences that may reflect discrimination, negotiation differences, or unmeasured factors. Claudia Goldin, whose research on women's labor market outcomes won the 2023 Nobel Prize in Economics, identifies the 'last chapter' of the pay gap as the earnings penalty for temporal flexibility — jobs that pay disproportionately high premiums for being available at irregular hours or without schedule interruptions tend to be male-dominated, and the motherhood penalty (the earnings decline women experience after having children, with no corresponding fatherhood bonus for men) is the largest driver of the remaining gap. Occupational segregation also plays a significant role: female-dominated professions systematically pay less than male-dominated professions requiring comparable skill and education, a pattern that persists even when individual skills are held constant. The debate about the pay gap is often unproductive because the raw gap and the adjusted gap measure different things, and both are real: the raw gap reflects actual earnings differences, and the adjusted gap shows that even equivalent workers are not paid equivalently.
What is intersectionality and why does it matter for feminism?
Intersectionality is the framework for understanding how different social identities — race, gender, class, sexuality, disability, nationality — interact and overlap in ways that create distinct forms of discrimination and privilege. The term was coined by legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw in her 1989 paper 'Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex,' which examined how Black women fell through the cracks of both anti-discrimination law. In DeGraffenreid v. General Motors, Black women were told they could not bring a combined race and sex discrimination claim because the company did hire Black workers (men) and did hire women (white). The framework failed to see the specific disadvantage facing Black women as Black women. Crenshaw's insight was that identities do not add up simply — being a Black woman is not just being Black plus being a woman, but a distinct social position with its own forms of disadvantage and visibility. Patricia Hill Collins developed intersectionality further in Black Feminist Thought (1990), introducing the concept of the 'matrix of domination' to describe how interlocking systems of oppression organize social life. Intersectionality expanded feminism's scope in crucial ways: it challenged the assumption that 'women's experience' could be adequately described from the perspective of white, middle-class, heterosexual women; it connected feminist analysis to analyses of race, class, and other systems of power; and it showed how legal and policy frameworks could inadvertently reinforce the disadvantages of the most marginalized. Critics argue that intersectionality can make political coalition-building difficult by fragmenting feminist solidarity into ever-smaller identity categories.
What is the difference between liberal feminism and radical feminism?
Liberal feminism and radical feminism represent distinct diagnoses of the problem of gender inequality, which lead to different prescriptions for change. Liberal feminism, associated with figures like Betty Friedan, Gloria Steinem, and the National Organization for Women (NOW), holds that the fundamental problem is unequal treatment of women under laws and institutions that were designed for and by men. The solution is reform: equal legal rights, equal access to education and employment, ending formal discrimination. Liberal feminism operates within existing social and economic institutions, seeking women's equal participation in them. It tends to be compatible with capitalism and with a politics focused on individual rights and merit. Radical feminism, associated with Kate Millett's Sexual Politics (1970) and Shulamith Firestone's The Dialectic of Sex (1970), argues that liberal feminism's diagnosis is too shallow. The problem is not unequal laws but patriarchy — the systematic domination of women by men — which is embedded not just in formal institutions but in sexuality, the family, reproduction, and culture. Millett argued that 'politics' needed to be understood as including personal and sexual relationships; hence the slogan 'the personal is political.' For radical feminism, piecemeal legal reform cannot dismantle a system of domination that operates through intimate life. Some radical feminists argued that heterosexuality itself was a political institution, and that genuine liberation required restructuring or escaping male-female sexual relationships. Socialist feminism combined both approaches, arguing that gender oppression and class oppression were inseparable systems that had to be dismantled together.
What is Simone de Beauvoir's contribution to feminist theory?
Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex, published in French in 1949 and translated into English in 1953, is arguably the most philosophically significant work in the feminist tradition. Its central argument is contained in the famous opening of its second volume: 'One is not born, but rather becomes, woman.' De Beauvoir drew on existentialist philosophy — primarily Jean-Paul Sartre's framework, though her contribution was substantially original — to argue that 'woman' is not a natural category defined by biology but a social construction, a role that patriarchal society imposes on those born female. Men, de Beauvoir argued, construct themselves as the universal human subject — the default, the norm — and define women as 'the Other,' a secondary and derivative category. Women are defined not by what they are but by their difference from and service to men. This analysis had several profound implications. It explained why women's subordination felt natural and inevitable even to women themselves: because the entire symbolic and cultural order presented it as the natural order. It suggested that liberation required not just legal rights but a fundamental transformation of consciousness and social relations. And it grounded feminist claims in a broader philosophical account of human freedom and self-determination. De Beauvoir's framework anticipated later arguments about gender as socially constructed, prefiguring Judith Butler's more radical claim in Gender Trouble (1990) that gender is not merely socially shaped but performatively constituted — brought into being through repeated actions rather than expressing a pre-existing inner identity.
What is the TERF debate and how does it divide feminism?
TERF stands for trans-exclusionary radical feminist — a term applied to feminists who hold that transgender women are not women for purposes of feminist analysis and politics, and who oppose transgender women's inclusion in female-only spaces such as women's shelters, prisons, and sports competitions. The debate has become one of the most divisive in contemporary feminism. Those holding trans-exclusionary positions typically argue from a radical feminist framework: if the sex class 'women' is defined by female biology and the reproductive capacity that grounds women's oppression, then transgender women — born male and socialized as male — do not share that oppressed status and may even reproduce male socialization in female spaces. Some cite concerns about safety in sex-segregated spaces and competitive fairness in women's sports. The opposing position, dominant in most mainstream feminist and LGBTQ+ organizations, holds that gender identity is the relevant category for feminist politics, that trans women face their own forms of severe oppression (including violence, discrimination, and high rates of suicide), and that excluding trans women from feminist coalitions compounds rather than alleviates that oppression. Judith Butler, whose work on gender performativity has been enormously influential in both feminist and trans theory, has been a prominent voice arguing that sex and gender are both socially constructed categories, and that the defense of a biological category of 'woman' re-inscribes the essentialism that feminism should be challenging. The debate reflects a fundamental tension between different definitions of 'woman' — biological, social, and self-identified — and different theories of where gender oppression originates.
How has the #MeToo movement changed feminist activism?
The #MeToo movement represents the most significant feminist mobilization since the second wave, and it illustrates both the distinctive features and tensions of fourth-wave feminism. Tarana Burke, a Black activist, founded the Me Too initiative in 2006 as a grassroots project to support survivors of sexual violence in underprivileged communities. The phrase went viral in October 2017 when actress Alyssa Milano invited women to share their experiences of sexual harassment and assault on Twitter in response to reporting about film producer Harvey Weinstein. Within 24 hours, the hashtag had been used 500,000 times; within a week, it had been used 12 million times. The movement's effects were substantial. Dozens of powerful men in entertainment, media, politics, and business lost their positions after allegations became public. Time's Up, founded in January 2018, created a legal defense fund for lower-income workers who could not otherwise afford to litigate harassment claims. Many workplaces revised harassment policies and training. Several states expanded statutes of limitations for sexual assault civil claims. The movement also revealed tensions within fourth-wave feminism: debates about due process versus believing accusers, the distinction between severe assault and less severe harassment, the question of whether cancellation is proportionate to offense, and whether the movement centered the experiences of prominent, mostly white women in elite industries at the expense of the more systemic harassment faced by workers in low-wage industries. Burke herself has frequently noted that the movement she founded was always intended to center the experiences of girls and women of color in marginalized communities.